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Abstract
Feeding external data to a blockchain, a.k.a. data feed, is
an essential task to enable blockchain interoperability and
support emerging cross-domain applications, notably sta-
blecoins. Given the data-intensive feeds in real life (e.g.,
high-frequency price updates) and the high cost in using
blockchain, namely Gas, it is imperative to reduce the Gas
cost of data feeds. Motivated by the constant-changing work-
loads in finance and other applications, this work focuses
on designing a dynamic, workload-aware approach for cost
effectiveness in Gas. This design space is understudied in
the existing blockchain research which has so far focused
on static data placement.
This work presents GRuB, a cost-effective data feed that
dynamically replicates data between the blockchain and an
off-chain cloud storage. GRuB’s data replication is workload-
adaptive by monitoring the current workload and making
online decisions w.r.t. data replication. A series of online al-
gorithms are proposed that achieve the bounded worst-case
cost in blockchain’s Gas. GRuB runs the decision-making
components on the untrusted cloud off-chain for lower Gas
costs, and employs a security protocol to authenticate the
data transferred between the blockchain and cloud. The over-
all GRuB system can autonomously achieve low Gas costs
with changing workloads.
We built a GRuB prototype functional with Ethereum and
Google LevelDB, and supported real applications in stable-
coins. Under real workloads collected from the Ethereum
contract-call history and mixed workloads of YCSB, we sys-
tematically evaluate GRuB’s cost which shows a saving of
Gas by 10% ∼ 74%, with comparison to the baselines of static
data-placement.
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1 Introduction
A smart contract is a user program that runs on a blockchain,
such as Ethereum [10] and EOS.IO [5]. It holds the promises
to expand the blockchain’s functionalities from the basic
cryptocurrency payments to broader applications in decen-
tralized finance, supply chains, online gaming, et al. Feeding
external data onto the blockchain, a.k.a. data feed, is an essen-
tial task to enable these blockchain applications. Today, data
feeds are widely adopted, notably in decentralized finance.
For instance, stablecoins, a cryptocurrency with stable price
that sees an explosion of interest (as in Facebook’s Libra [11])
and deployment (as in the popular DAI [23] and Tether [24]
tokens on Ethereum) since 2019, require feeding real-world
asset prices to the blockchain, for instance the Ether-price
feed used in DAI [23]. For another instance, to enable asset
exchange across different blockchains, say allowing a Bitcoin
owner to transact with an Ethereum token owner, it entails
a “side-chain” feed such as BtcRelay [2, 8, 67] to send the re-
cently found Bitcoin blocks onto Ethereum for verifying Bit-
coin deposit. There are many other blockchain applications
that have been or can be enabled by data feeds, including
decentralized insurance [69], tracing supply-chains [17, 63],
healthcare [51], transparency logging [14, 30, 64], trustless
information-security [15], et al.
Operating today’s data feeds can be an expensive busi-
ness. Specifically, many real-world data feeds generate an
intensive stream of data updates at a high frequency (e.g.,
the price updates in seconds and microseconds). Under these
data-intensive streams, data feeds, if improperly designed,
could cause a heavy use of blockchain and lead to high mon-
etary cost, known as Gas [66]. The expense burdens not only
data-feed operators (e.g., ChainLink andMakerDAO) but also
the financial applications running on top of the data feeds
(e.g., decentralized exchanges such as AmpleForth and Syn-
theix [48]), eventually transferring to high fees for end users
(e.g., users of decentralized exchanges). It is thus impera-
tive to design cost-effective data feeds for scaling blockchain
applications to support real-world data-intensive scenarios.
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The goal of this work is to explore how a dynamic,
workload-aware design of data feed can effectively save Gas.
The design goal is motivated by 1) the observation that real-
world financial applications exhibit highly dynamic work-
load patterns, which present opportunities to reduce costs
— Intuitively, if one can dynamically adjust the location of
the data feeds (w.r.t. the blockchain) according to the current
data supply-demand, the Gas cost caused by the repeated
use of blockchains could be avoided. See the next two para-
graphs for a detailed justification. 2) Furthermore, the design
space of a workload-aware approach has not been studied
in the existing blockchain-systems research. While there
is a large body of research works on reducing blockchain
costs, notably the layer-two protocols exemplified by pay-
ment channels [16, 36, 52, 56] that aim to place application
logic off the blockchain, all existing approaches are based
on static data placement. That is, the placement of data and
computation w.r.t. blockchains stays fixed once the system
starts running, and it does not reflect the constant change
in the workloads. The design space of a dynamic, workload-
aware approach to optimize the smart-contract cost (in Gas)
for data feeds and blockchain applications beyond is an un-
charted territory.
This work presents GRuB, a workload-adaptive data repli-
cation framework for cost-effective data feeding. The system
model is a data pipeline involving three actors: As illustrated
in the left part of Figure 1, an off-chain data producer (DO)
feeds a stream of data updates to multiple data-consumer
smart contracts (DUs) on the blockchain. The data flow is
coordinated by an intermediarykey-value (KV) store between
the DO and DUs. A conventional design of data feed is to
realize the KV store in a smart contract that accepts DO’s
data updates in transactions and DU’s queries in contract
internal calls. An alternative design is to statically place the
KV store off the blockchain (e.g., the static off-chain feed,
TownCrier [69]). By contrast, GRuB is a KV store built on
hybrid storage media: By default, the data updates are per-
sisted on an off-chain cloud storage provider (SP) such as
Amazon S3 [1] and upon DU’s queries, are brought to the
blockchain, buffered in a smart-contract memory. Optionally,
the buffered data can be persisted to the smart-contract stor-
age, as a data replica, to benefit future read queries. GRuB’s
system model is illustrated by the right part of Figure 1. Note
that our system model assuming any cloud provider is un-
trusted should be differentiated from the multi-cloud model
adopted in existing works [29, 33] which trusts at least one
cloud provider.
The key decision to make in GRuB is whether and when a
data record in the feed should be replicated onto the smart-
contract storage on a blockchain. Always storing a replica
of the data being read, on the one hand, can benefit future
data reads by avoiding loading data onto the blockchain re-
peatedly. On the other hand, if there are no future reads,
such a data replica would be wasted. Thus, GRuB chooses to
gPuts
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Figure 1. System model: The conventional data feed (left
part) shows an on-chain KV store in a smart contract that me-
diate between an off-chain data producer (DO) and multiple
on-chain data-consumer smart contracts (DUs). GRuB (the
right part) introduces an off-chain cloud storage provider (SP)
in the system model, which, together with a smart contract,
provides a hybrid KV store that exposes a remote-procedure
call interface (i.e., gPuts) to the DO and an internal-call
interface (i.e., gGet with callbacks) to the DU smart con-
tracts. With the default storage on SP, the fed data is dynam-
ically replicated onto the blockchain by demand (in blue).
Green in this figure illustrates smart contracts running on a
blockchain and red is the SP who is the primary adversary
in our trust model.
replicate data in a workload-adaptive manner: If the current
workload is dominated by the reads from DUs, the GRuB
would decide to store a data replica on the blockchain. Oth-
erwise, if the current workload is dominated by the updates
from the DO, the GRuB would decide to avoid replicating
data on chain. This design systematically avoids the two
most expensive operations in Gas. That is, replicating data
on chain under read-intensive workloads can avoid the ex-
pensive transactions otherwise needed to bring data onto the
blockchain, and evicting data replicas under write-intensive
workloads can prevent the expensive storage writes in smart
contracts. See Section 2.2 for details on Ethereum’s Gas-based
cost model and Section 2.3 for a basic measurement study
that corroborates our insight here.
Dynamic decision making w.r.t. data replication has been
a well-studied research topic in conventional distributed sys-
tems. Briefly, a common approach [43] is to model the target
system by multiple “sites”, and run workload monitoring
and decision making distributedly on each site. These solu-
tions lay an important foundation for designing dynamic
data-replication in GRuB. However, simply using them as
they are in GRuB is insufficient. Notably, existing dynamic
replication frameworks are not designed with blockchain’s
Gas cost model in mind or do not reflect the GRuB’s cost to
enforce data security (e.g., on untrusted SP off-chain). If used
improperly in GRuB, they may lead to excessive costs; for
instance, the Gas model charges higher unit cost (e.g., per
word) for “local” operations in smart contract (e.g., on-chain
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storage updates) than for data movement over the network
(by transactions). Such a unique cost characteristic may inval-
idate the existing design that collocates the decision making
with data replicas.
To fill the gap, GRuB presents a Gas-aware data-replication
system which places workload monitoring and decision mak-
ing off the blockchain. We propose a security protocol to
guarantee the integrity of workload trace and replication
decisions that are transferred from untrusted off-chain SP
to the blockchain. The decisions in GRuB are made by a
Gas-aware online algorithm that achieves the bounded “Gas
competitiveness” – Specifically, the worst-case Gas caused by
the data replication following the decision made by this on-
line algorithm is bounded by a small-constant multiplicative
factor (e.g., 2) to that caused by an optimal offline algorithm.
This work emphasizes building a data-replicationmechanism
supporting sample policies to bound competitiveness. A com-
prehensive study of policies to configure the mechanism is
out of the scope. Overall, GRuB can autonomously run in the
hybrid data feeds with changing workloads, while keeping
the Gas low.
GRuB’s system is generic: To support applications, GRuB
exposes an extensible KV store interface (API) that supports
Puts from the DO and Gets with callbacks to process queries
in a DU contract. GRuB can be built relying on generic in-
terfaces of the underlying systems (similar to an ABI); that
is, any blockchain supporting smart contracts and any off-
chain storage services supporting KV storage. We have built
a GRuB prototype functional with Ethereum [10] and Google
LevelDB [13], and used it to enable a financial application:
A stablecoin collateralized with an Ether-price feed built on
GRuB. Based on the real-world workloads collected from
Ethereum, we evaluate GRuB’s Gas cost, which shows that
GRuB can save up to 67% Gas compared to the static-data-
placement baselines. For more extensive evaluation, we build
a benchmark by mixing the YCSB workloads. The evalua-
tion under YCSB benchmark shows that compared to the
baselines, GRuB can save Gas by 10% ∼ 74% depending on
specific record sizes and read-write ratios.
The contributions of this paper are outline as following:
1. Propose a dynamic, workload-adaptive approach by
mixing on-chain and off-chain data storage to optimize the
smart-contract costs. To the best of our knowledge, this iden-
tifies an unexplored design space in the existing blockchain
research.
2. Present GRuB, a Gas-efficient data feed by dynamically
replicating data between the hybrid data storage on and
off the blockchain. GRuB employs new techniques, a Gas-
aware online algorithm for replication decision-making and
a security-centric protocol for running the decision compo-
nents off-chain at a low cost.
3. Validate the applicability of GRuB and evaluate its cost
in Gas extensively, by systematically studying real-world
applications, building a benchmark suite from real-world
traces, and evaluating the costs. The result shows that GRuB
can achieve a Gas saving by 10% ∼ 74% when compared to
static data-placement baselines.
2 Design Motivations
2.1 Preliminary on Motivating Applications
Data feeding enables a blockchain to be able to interoperate
with external worlds (i.e., the blockchain interoperability),
which further enables a good number of deployed blockchain
applications in cross-domain scenarios. Here, we describe
two such applications in detail, as an effort to motivate our
work.
Stablecoins (on price feeds): Unlike Bitcoin, Ether and other
“native” cryptocurrencies, a stablecoin is a cryptocurrency
with stable prices. Price stability is the key requirement for
real-world adoption of today’s cryptocurrencies in realistic
applications (e.g., loans, derivatives, and prediction markets).
Recently, there is an explosion of stablecoins proposed (e.g.,
Facebook Libra) and deployed (e.g., DAI [23], Tether [24],
and the other 57 stablecoins operational on Ethereum, as of
May 2020 [27]).
There are different approaches to realize price stabil-
ity [37]: A stablecoin can be either directly backed by a
stable asset (e.g., USD or gold) or indirectly backed via yet
another cryptocurrency. The latter design, named indirectly-
backed stablecoin, has the benefit of not relying on a trusted
third-party vault off-chain to keep collateral and is adopted
in popular stablecoins such as DAI [23] which is indirectly
backed by Ether. To manage the price instability of Ether
itself, the DAI runs a smart contract on Ethereum that con-
trols the issuance and redemption of DAI. To make each DAI
redeemable with one-USD worth of Ether, the DAI smart
contract needs to be aware of the current price of Ether (or
Ether-USD exchange rate). This is done by a price feed in
practice [12], which upload the stream of price updates from
a trusted source off-chain, such as Coinbase.1
Cross-chain swaps (on side-chain feeds): Supporting as-
set swaps across multiple blockchains is an important fi-
nancial application paradigm, enabling asset liquidity on
Blockchains. For instance, there are Bitcoin-pegged ERC20 to-
kens on Ethereum [25] which allow a Bitcoin owner to trans-
act with an asset owner on Ethereum. An efficient approach
to enable such applications is the side-chain paradigm where
blockchain A feeds its produced blocks to smart contracts
running on blockchain B. For instance, BtcRelay [2, 8] is such
a side-chain feed connecting Bitcoin and Ethereum. BtcRe-
lay style side-chain feeds are widely used in Bitcoin-pegged
ERC20 tokens (e.g., tBTC [4, 22, 28] and others [25, 67]),
Ethereum lottery games [3, 9], et al.
1The off-chain party trusted by an indirectly-backed stablecoin performs a
much simpler task than that by the directly-backed stablecoin. The former is
a price feed, while the latter is a full-fledged vault storing the collateralized
asset, subject to the public auditing [37, 53].
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Figure 2. The workloads of ethPriceOracle [18] that feed
the MakerDAO stablecoin platform [19] on Ethereum
Other than the above two classes of data feeds, there are
many other uses of data feeds, either deployed or envisioned.
For instance, running flight insurances on Ethereum requires
data feeds to provide flight cancel/deploy information. Run-
ning stock exchanges may require an off-chain order book to
feed stock/order prices. In other domains, blockchains are en-
visioned to support the auditing of transparency logs [14, 64],
where the smart contracts running auditing logic need data
feeds of log updates from off-chain servers.
Table 1. Distribution of writes by the number of reads fol-
lowed in the ethPriceOracle trace (#r represents the number
of reads per write)
#r Percentage #r Percentage #r Percentage
0 70.4% 5 0.76% 10 0.13%
1 16.0% 6 0.63% 12 0.13%
2 6.46% 7 0.25% 13 0.25%
3 2.91% 8 0.13% 17 0.13%
4 1.52% 9 0.25% 20 0.13%
Workloads: In these applications, the workload a data-
feed serves consists of data reads from the consumer smart-
contracts and the updates from the data producer. One of the
motivating observations of this work is that many real-world
workloads in data feeds fluctuate widely in the read-write
ratio. Here, we present a measurement result as an exam-
ple. EthPriceOracle [18] is a price feed operational in the
Ethereum mainnet and in use to support indirectly-backed
stablecoin DAI, as part of the MakerDAO platform [19]. Eth-
PriceOracle allows 14 off-chain accounts to update the price
feed and is implemented as a smart contract supporting a
price-update function (i.e., poke()) and a price-read function
(i.e., peek()). We collected a call trace of poke() and peek()
between April 25th, 2018 to April 30th, 2018; the collection
is done in two means, by running an Ethereum full node and
by querying a public Ethereum dataset hosted on Google
BigQuery [7]. Figure 2 plots the 5-day trace where each X
tick is a data-feed update (i.e., a poke() call) and the Y value
associated with a X value is the number of data-feed reads
(i.e., peek() calls) immediately following the write in the
call trace. The workload distribution is also summarized in
Table 1. It can be seen that the number of reads following a
write fluctuate; half of Y values are 0 and 1, but occasionally
it also reaches as high as 20 reads after a write.
While this is the case of one particular application, the
data-feed workloads being fluctuating commonly apply. Be-
cause in a typical data feed, the updates are produced con-
tinuously at a regular rate, while the reads from the data
consumer smart contract are by demand, which typically
come and go in an ad-hoc fashion.
2.2 System Model and Trust Model
In this subsection, we formally describe the system model
introduced before. Recall Figure 1 that our system model
includes three parties: A data producers (DO), a key-value
(KV) store (i.e., the GRuB) and a number of data-consumer
smart contracts (DUs). The off-chain DO sends data updates
to the KV store, by invoking its function, gPuts. A DU smart
contract queries the data feed stored in the KV store by
issuing a function call to gGet. The two functions exposed
by the KV store are described by Listing 1.
// external call by off -chain DO
bool gPuts(KV[] kvs);
// internal call by smart contract (DU)
KV[] gGet(Key k1, Callback cb);
Listing 1. GRuB APIs
Specifically, a single gPuts call by the data producer
batches multiple KV records in an epoch (e.g., every 1 min.)
to update the KV store. A gGet call issued by a DU smart
contract retrieves KV records by a specified data key and
returns its control to an optional callback function in the
caller smart contract. The callback function often executes
query-processing logic based on the retrieved KV records.
Here, note that the caller of gPuts is the off-chain data pro-
ducer and it can be implemented as a remote-procedure call,
for instance, in Python. The caller of gGet is a smart contract
and it can be implemented as a Solidity function.
GRuB is a KV store based on “hybrid” storage media both
on and off the blockchain. On the blockchain, it runs a
storage-manager smart contract. Off the blockchain, it runs
a KV store instance on an untrusted cloud storage provider
(SP), such as Amazon S3.
GRuB can be used as a base to support different domain
applications. To do so, an application developer writes a DU
smart contract encoding the application logic and embedding
a query-processor function to be called by gGet. GRuB can
enable a price feed: Recall Section 2.1 that a price feed sup-
ports a price-update function poke() and a price-read func-
tion peek(). These two functions can be mapped to GRuB’s
gPuts and gGet, respectively, by modeling the price of each
collateral asset as a KV record (e.g., ⟨Ether, 150USD⟩). Sec-
tion 4 presents two end-to-end applications built on GRuB.
Trust model: In our system, the primary adversary is the
untrusted cloud storage provider who can forge, replay, omit
and fork the data sent to the blockchain, in order to break
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the data integrity. The “data” includes the KV records, proofs
and various protocol-specific metadata including collected
trace of workloads and replication decisions. We assume
high availability among all participating parties and exclude
denial-of-service attacks from the scope of this paper. All
smart contracts including the application smart contracts
and GRuB’s storage-manager contracts are trusted in terms
of program security (no exploitable security bugs), execution
non-stoppability, etc. We also make standard assumption
on blockchain security that the blockchain is immutable,
fork-consistent and Sybil-secure. The underlying security
assumption is that a deployed blockchain system runs among
a large number of peers where majority of them are honest
peers and compromising the majority is hard.
Table 2. Ethereum’s Gas cost w.r.t. different operations [66]:
Operations related to data movement (transactions) and stor-
age updates are the most expensive in Gas.
Operation Gas cost (X is the number of 32-byte words)
Transaction Ctx (X ) = 21000 + 2176X (X < 1000)
Storage write (insert) Cinser t (X ) = 20000X
Storage write (update) Cupdate (X ) = 5000X
Storage read Cr ead (X ) = 200X
Hash computation Chash (X ) = 30 + 6X
Cost model: The primary cost considered in this work is
the cost in using blockchains and executing smart contracts.
This paper considers the use of Ethereum. Table 2 presents
the Ethereum cost model in Gas (the cost unit in Ethereum).
It can be seen the most expensive operations in Gas per word
are transactions and storage writes/updates. In our system
model, the use of cloud service (SP) may also lead to expenses,
which however is much cheaper than that of blockchains:
Consider storing one gigabytes in today’s cloud storage,
which falls under the free tier for all major providers (i.e.,
Amazon S3, Dropbox, et al), leading to zero-dollar spending,
whereas doing the same on Ethereum costs more than $231
million USD (with the Ether price as of Nov. 2019). Because
of this, the cloud-service fee in our target application is
negligible compared with the Gas cost from blockchains.
Also reducing the Gas of a blockchain application implies
improving the throughput of this application, because 1)
the transaction throughput of a blockchain is bounded by
the total Gas a block can take, such as 10 million gas per
Ethereum block; reducing the Gas per operation implies the
application can submitmore operations in a given time. 2)We
assume blockchain is the bottleneck of a target application,
which currently takes tens of transactions per second and
is much lower than that of conventional computer systems,
even for a single machine. Thus, the main goal of this work
is to reduce the Gas cost of a blockchain application.
2.3 Motivating Cost Observation
Design Space: This work addresses the design of hybridized
data storage over blockchain and SP. We consider the two
design baselines: 1) data is only stored on the off-chain SP
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Figure 3. Preliminary Gas measurements of static baselines
and is brought into the smart-contract memory when serv-
ing gGet. This baseline is named BL1. Alternatively, 2) data
is stored both on the off-chain SP and on blockchain. The
baseline is named BL2. Note that our cost model only consid-
ers blockchain-induced cost, Gas, and excludes the off-chain
costs including cloud service fee (on SP). Thus, BL2’s cost is
equivalent to the design of placing data storage only on the
blockchain. Note that these two baselines are based on static
decisions regarding data replication.
Measurement observation: To motivate dynamic data
replication of this work, we conduct a rapid measurement
study: In this study, we consider the simplest data model
involving a single KV record. We implement a simple smart
contract on the Ethereum testnet that processes the single KV
record with optional on-chain storage. We use an off-chain
machine running Ethereum client geth, to represent the SP.
The two static baselines, BL1 and BL2, are implemented. We
use a series of workloads with varying read-write ratios.
Each workload is a repeated sequence of X1 writes followed
by X2 reads (all of which are under the single data key). On
the one end, we use a write-only sequence , that is, X 2X 1 = 0.
On the other end, we use a read-intensive sequence with
each write followed by 256 reads X 2X 1 = 256. After driving
each workload to our system, we measure the average Gas
per operation on BL1 and BL2. We vary the read-to-write
ratio (X 2X 1 ) and report BL1 and BL2’s Gas per operation in
Figure 3.
It is clear that as the workload changes from thewrite-only
sequence to read-intensive ones, there is a tradeoff between
the two static baselines. When the workload is write-only,
BL1 achieves lower Gas per operation than BL2, with cost
saving more than 100×. When the workload becomes about
every 1.5 read per write (i.e., X 2X 1 = 1.5), the two approaches
cost equal Gas. When the workload is more read intensive,
such as X 2X 1 = 256, BL2’s Gas per operation is
1
7 of BL1’s.
While having a data replica on the blockchain is expected
to shift the cost distributions between reads and writes, the
striking cost difference it makes (100× and 7×) was sur-
prising to us. This can be attributed to Ethereum’s unique
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cost model: When the workload is write-only, the always-
replicate baseline (BL2) incurs expensive operations to up-
date smart-contract storage, which costs 5, 000 ∼ 20, 000
Gas per word; recall Table 2. When the workload is read in-
tensive, the never-replicate baseline (BL1) incurs expensive
transactions to move the latest value of KV record to the
blockchain, while BL2 avoids the expense by reading storage
data on chain; recall Table 2 that a read from smart-contract
storage costs 200 Gas per word while a transaction costs
a much higher 2176 per word; let alone the initial cost of
21, 000 of an empty transaction.
3 GRuB: System Design and Impl.
GRuB overview: Recall the system model in Section 2.2
that a trusted DO feeds data updates to the GRuB KV store,
which is queried by DU smart contracts. The internal system
of the GRuB consists of two “planes”, as depicted in Figure 4:
1) A secure-data plane where the DO securely updates the
KV store on GRuB by associating data updates with proofs,
and a DU smart contract querying the GRuB retrieves query
proofs to authenticate (non-replicated) KV records stored
on the untrusted cloud provider. The data plane runs a secu-
rity protocol known as authenticated data structures (ADS;
which will be introduced and described in Section 3.3) across
the DO, the SP and the blockchain. 2) A control plane which
monitors the workloads (data updates and reads), makes
replication decisions w.r.t. individual KV records, and stores
the decisions as auxiliary states in each KV record, which
instructs the data plane to materialize the decisions. The con-
trol plane runs on the trusted DO and federates the traces of
data reads (from the blockchain’s natively logged contract-
call history) and data updates. The key component of GRuB
is a series of online decision-making algorithms running in
the control plane.
In this section, we describe the algorithm design of on-
line decision maker, which is the core of GRuB’s control
plane (Section 3.1), the control-plane system design (Sec-
tion 3.2), the data-plane system design (Section 3.3), overall
system properties (Section 3.4) and implementation notes
(Section 3.5).
3.1 Online Decision-Making: Algorithm Design &
Analysis
In this subsection, we describe the online decision-making al-
gorithm: Given a sequence of gPuts and gGet calls, GRuB’s
decision-making algorithm produces the replication deci-
sions on affected KV records. The replication decision will
be actuated as described in the next subsection. The design
goal of such algorithms is to reduce the Gas cost of future
data reads and writes based on the assumption that the read-
/write history will repeat. Intuitively, the algorithm needs to
predict the future reads/writes on the KV record, estimate
the cost of the two alternative decisions (R or NR) based on
the prediction, and pick the one with lower costs as the out-
put. Using the existing online algorithms [43] is insufficient
as they are designed without awareness to GRuB’s cost in
Gas and the cost caused by security proofs. We propose algo-
rithm designs and configurations that are tailored to GRuB’s
unique costs and that can autonomously achieve bounded
worst-case Gas cost. In the following, we present the design
and analysis of two algorithms: a “memoryless” online algo-
rithm that resets its state/memory about past reads/writes
upon each run, and a “memorizing” online algorithm that
remembers the operation history across runs.
Memoryless Algorithm The memoryless algorithm for
replication decision making is described in Algorithm 1. The
algorithm internally maintains a list of counters, each for a
NR record. The counter counts the number of consecutive
reads on the data record that are received since the last write.
The algorithm iterates through the read/write trace. Upon a
write on a record, say ⟨k,v⟩, the algorithm resets the counter
of record ⟨k,v⟩ back to zero and updates the record’s NR.
Upon a read on a NR record, it increments its counter. When
the counter reaches a preset parameter, K , the algorithm
changes the record’s state from NR to R and removes the
data record from the list of counters.
Algorithm 1MemorylessRepl(ops , count , states)
Input: read/write operations ops , read count count , and the
replication states states
Output: updated replication states states
1: for all o ∈ ops do
2: if o.isWrite() then
3: count[o.key] = 0; states[o.key].set(NR);
4: else
5: if count[o.key] < K then
6: count[o.key] + +;
7: end if
8: if count[o.key] ≥ K then
9: states[o.key].set(R);
10: else
11: states[o.key].set(NR);
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
Algorithm analysis: The memoryless algorithm in Al-
gorithm 1 has competitiveness (w.r.t. the worst-case Gas)
bounded by 1+K Cr ead_of fCupdate . Here,Cupdate is the Gas to update
a byte on the blockchain storage, and Cr ead_of f is the unit
Gas to send one byte data from off-chain to the blockchain.
The algorithmic competitiveness is analyzed in Appendix A.
Parameter configuration: Parameter K decides the per-
formance of memoryless algorithm. To bound the worst-case
Gas, we can set K to be the following to make the algorithm
2-competitive:
K = Cupdate/Cr ead_of f (1)
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Figure 4. The overview of GRuB distributed system
Note that Equation 1 implies a static value for K . In a
dynamic replication scheme, using static K , while seemingly
counterintuitive, has the benefit of bounded competitiveness
and can also result in actual workload-adaptive cost behavior
(as will be evaluated in Section 5 and particularly in Figure 9).
There can be other policies to configure K , including setting
K dynamic and adaptive to the workload for lower Gas. A
comprehensive study of K configuration policies is out of
scope of this work, the main goal of which is providing a
mechanism evaluated by selected policies.
Algorithm 2 MemorizingRepl(ops , rCount ,wCount , states)
Input: read/write operations ops , read counts rCount , write
countswCount and the replication states states
Output: updated replication states states
1: for all o ∈ ops do
2: if o.isWrite() thenwCount[o.key] + +;
3: else rCount[o.key] + +;
4: end if
5: if wCount[o.key] ∗ K ′ + D <= rCount[o.key] then
6: states[o.key].set(R);
7: end if
8: if wCount[o] ∗ Y − K ′ > rCount[o.key] then
9: states[o.key].set(NR);
10: end if
11: end for
Memorizing Algorithm In practice, workloads exhibit
temporal locality and can have repeated sequences of read-
/write operations. The memoryless algorithm does not cap-
ture the temporal locality in the workload by forgetting the
past operation history. We propose a memorizing algorithm
that exploits the temporal locality in workloads by memo-
rizing the decisions made for similar operations in the past.
The memorizing algorithm takes as input the trace of reads
and writes. Note that unlike the memoryless algorithm, the
memorizing algorithm takes in the trace of on-chain data
reads.
The algorithm, described in Algorithm 2, maintains two
counters for each data record, rCount andwCount . rCount
(wCount ) increments when the algorithm, iterating through
the read/write trace, encounters a read (write) operation.
The algorithm checks two conditions upon each read/write
operation: If the condition holds,wCount∗K ′+D <= rCount ,
the record’s state is updated from NR to R. Here, D is a time
window in the past the algorithm looks into to characterize
the current workload and to predict the future one. It also
resets wCount to zero and reduces the value of rCount to
D. If the condition holds, wCount ∗ K ′ − D >= rCount , the
record’s state is updated from R to NR. It also resets rCount
to zero and reduces the value ofwCount to D/K ′.
Parameter configuration: Similar to the memoryless
algorithm, parameter K ′ is set to the ratio of on-chain write
cost to off-chain read cost. K ′ = Cwrite/Cr ead_of f . The other
parameter D determines how sensitive the replication state
is to the workload. A small D leads to frequent changes of
replication state, while a large D leads to a stable setting of
replication state.
Algorithm analysis: As analyzed in Appendix A, the
memorizing Algorithm 2 is 4D+2K ′ -competitive.
3.2 System Control Plane
The previous subsection describes the online decision-
making algorithms and their analysis. This subsection de-
scribes how to execute the algorithm in the control plane of
GRuB. The control plane runs on the DO and is depicted in
Figure 4. It consists of three essential components: a work-
load monitor that collects the trace of data reads and writes,
the algorithm executor that executes the online algorithm
with the monitored trace, and a decision actuator that stores
the decisions along with the records in the KV store.
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Concretely, the workload monitor running on the DO fed-
erates the trace of data updates that occur locally and the
trace of data reads from the blockchain history. Here, we con-
sider that the blockchain has a builtin support to log smart-
contract invocations, as is the case in Ethereum. The DO
runs a blockchain client in full synchronization with other
blockchain nodes; the client stores the contract-invocation
history, from which the call sequence of gGet’es can be ac-
cessed. In practice, the DO can run a light blockchain client
such as Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) client without
downloading the transaction history.
The algorithm output, namely replication decisions, is
stored as an auxiliary state in each data record in the KV
store. Given a KV record, say ⟨k,v⟩, its key is prefixed with
an extra bit that indicates whether the record has a replica
on the blockchain (i.e., state R) or not (i.e., state NR). The
state bit will instruct the data-plane of the system to execute
the replication decisions, accordingly (See Section 3.3).
This design assumes a trusted blockchain client whose
synchronization with a remote blockchain network is se-
cured by external mechanisms; the client can increase the
number of neighbor peers to guarantee the integrity of in-
formation synchronized (including blocks and transactions)
in the case of compromised blockchain nodes. We dismissed
the alternative design by receiving the trace of gGet from
the untrusted SP which is incentivized to forge the trace and
mislead the DO to make a NR decision. Specifically, a NR
decision implies more use of the cloud service and the SP
can charge higher service fee.
3.3 System Data Plane
This subsection describes the system data plane, in terms of
write and read paths. That is, how GRuB handles batched
data updates and replication-state transitions from the DO
(write path) and data reads from a DU under the current
replication states (read path). To guarantee the data authen-
ticity against an adversarial SP, a security protocol, ADS, is
adopted in the data plane of GRuB. We begin with a back-
ground introduction to ADS.
Preliminary onADS: An ADS protocol, or authenticated
data structure, is a security protocol running among a data
owner (ADS_DO), an untrusted service provider (ADS_SP)
and multiple data users (ADS_DU). In its most basic form,
the ADS_SP accepts data updates (individual KV records)
from the ADS_DO and serves exact-match queries (by data
keys) issued by ADS_DU. The security properties an ADS
guarantee is the authenticity of KV records including record
integrity, query completeness and freshness against an ad-
versarial ADS_SP who can forge, replay, omit and fork [46]
records in a query.
An ADS protocol can be constructed in different ways [45,
50, 50, 54, 55, 61, 70] and GRuB can be easily adapted to these
constructions. In our current prototype implementation, we
use the common construction based on a Merkle tree. That is,
the ADS_SP constructs a Merkle tree on the dataset, each leaf
storing the hash of a data record, sorted by their keys. When
the ADS_DO wants to update the dataset, she first retrieves
the authentication proof of the data key to be updated from
the ADS_SP, verifies the data integrity, computes the new
leaf hash, and then computes the new root hash based on the
proof. The ADS_DO can then safely send the updated data
record to the ADS_SP. For data freshness, the ADS_DO can
periodically publish the signed root hash to the SP. When a
data user, ADS_DU, queries the dataset by a queried key, SP
can serve the query by returning the matched KV record and
its associated proof. The proof including the latest signed
root hash from the trusted ADS_DO can be used to verify the
integrity, completeness, and freshness of the query result.
In GRuB, the KV records are sorted by their data keys
on SP. Recall that each GRuB record’s data key is extended
with a prefix of replication state (R or NR). The Merkle tree
on ADS_SP is constructed on the key-sorted data layout
of records. An example Merkle tree in GRuB is depicted in
Figure 4b where the four KV records are first ordered by
their NR/R states and then by their actual data keys.
Write path: Given a stream of data updates, DO sends a
gPuts call every epoch. To prepare the call, DO locally
batches the data updates and include them in the single
gPuts call to be sent by the end of the epoch. Internally,
the gPuts first notifies the control plane on DO of the latest
data updates. Then, for each data update, DO runs the ADS
protocol with the SP to securely update the matching KV
records.
If all KV records in this batch are in non-replicated state
(NR) and there is no update on the replication state, the DO
sends only the digest of this batch to call the update() func-
tion in the storage-manager smart contract. Note that the
blockchain node on DO receiving the update() call would
propagate it to other blockchain nodes. If there are any KV
records with replicated state (R), they are included in the
update() call. If there is any state transition, either from
R to NR or from NR to R, such transitions are included in
the update() call. Receiving the call, the storage-manager
contract would insert a new replica to on-chain storage if
there is a transition from NR to R. It would evict an existing
replica if there is a transition from R to NR.
Read path: Given a gGet call from a DU smart contract,
all blockchain nodes would execute the storage-manager
contract to handle the call. If the requested data key can
be matched to a R KV record replicated on the blockchain,
the storage manager simply returns the record into the call-
back function. Otherwise, it emits an event recorded in the
Ethereum log via calling our request function. The event
can be captured externally by a watchdog service on SP.
Specifically, the request event is recorded on all Ethereum
nodes including the client running on SP. The SP runs an
external daemon process (watchdog) that spins on the log to
wait for a request event. The event triggers the SP to query
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its local KV store for the requested record before sending it
back to the storage-manager contract via calling the deliver
function. The deliver function verifies the integrity of the
KV records from off-chain before invoking the callback with
the verified KV record.
contract GRuB.StorageManager {
bytes32 rootHash;
mapping(uint256=>uint256) KVReplicas;
function gGet(uint256 key , uint256 callback){
uint256 value = KVReplicas[key];
if(value != null) callback(key , value);
// request () emits an EVM log event
request(key , deliver , callback);}
function deliver(uint256 key , uint256 value , bool
replicate , uint256 proof , uint256 callback){
if(! verify(key ,value ,proof ,rootHash)) return false;
if(replicate) KVReplicas[key] = value;
callback(key ,value);}
function update(uint256 [] keys , uint256 [] values ,
uint256 digest){
if(msg.sender = DO) rootHash = digest;
for(int i = 0; i < keys.length; i++){
if(values[i]. replicate) KVReplicas[keys[i]]= values[
i];
else delete KVReplicas[keys[i]]; }}}
Listing 2. GRuB’s storage-manager smart contract
The pseudo code of storage-manager smart contract is de-
scribed in Listing 2. The more detailed data-plane workflow
is described in Appendix B.2.
3.4 Protocol Consistency
In this section, we present the consistency of GRuB protocol
and leave more formal proofs to Appendix E.
To describe the protocol consistency, we assume a hy-
pothetical global clock synchronized across the DO and all
blockchain nodes. Note that this clock is used as a tool for
protocol analysis and is not required in the actual implemen-
tation of GRuB.
Blockchain & GRuB model: In a vanilla blockchain, it
takes Pt time units to propagate a transaction to all nodes in
the blockchain network. It takes an average of B time units
to produce a block. Only after F blocks are produced, a trans-
action is considered finalized in the blockchain network. For
instance, in Ethereum, F is 250 and B is 10 ∼ 19 seconds [66].
In GRuB, an epoch E is the time interval in which the DO
waits and batches data updates in a transaction.
Consistency between gPut and gGet: Suppose at time
t1 the DO submits a gPut(k,v) and at time t2 a blockchain
node Ni executes gGet(k). After t2 + Pt + B · F , assume the
execution of gGet(k) is finalized on the blockchain.
Particularly, when the record gGet(k) accesses is not repli-
cated (NR), time t2 refers towhen the internal call of gGet(k)
is being entered and returned by the blockchain node (the
synchronous execution finishes instantly). When the record
gGet(k) accesses is not replicated (NR), gGet(k) is executed
asynchronously and is called back by a deliver transaction.
In this case t2 refers to when the deliver transaction is
executed on node Ni .
Theorem 3.1 (Non-deterministic ordering of concurrent
gPut/gGet). If t1 < t2 < t1 + E + Pt + B · F , gPut(k,v)
is said to occur concurrently with gGet(k). With GRuB, the
ordering between concurrent gPut(k,v) and gGet(k) is non-
deterministic and is the same across all blockchain nodes after
t2 + Pt + B · F .
Suppose a gGet(k) issued by a DU smart contract at local
time t on blockchain node Ni returns a set of KV records
qs . Query result qs is fresh, w.r.t. delay d , if all KV records
matching key k and updated on data owner DO before t − d
are included in qs . Here, it assumes a global clock synchro-
nized across the DO and any blockchain nodes Ni . Note that
query freshness also implies query completeness here.
Theorem 3.2 (Epoch-bounded query freshness between se-
quential gPut/gGet). If t2 > t1 + E + Pt + B · F , gPut(k,v) is
said to occur sequentially after gGet(k). Given a gGet sequen-
tially after a gPut, GRuB guarantees the gGet query freshness.
Here, the parameters are epoch E, block time B, propagation
delay Pt and the number of blocks needed for finality F .
Supporting delay-sensitive applications: GRuB in-
curs a maximum delay of E to feed data to the blockchain.
Recall that in baseline BL2, data updates are sent directly,
without batching, to the blockchain. BL2 guarantees the gGet
query freshness w.r.t. delay Pt + F · B. Applications with the
urgent need to feed data can be supported by BL2 where an
individual data update is fed to the blockchain immediately
after the DO produces it. Note that one can retrofit BL2 to
GRuB for supporting these applications where data updates
are selected to opt for BL2.
3.5 Implementation Notes
We have built a prototype of GRuB with Ethereum and a
Google LevelDB [13] instance. Note that GRuB’s design
is generally applicable to any storage service exposing a
KV store interface (e.g., Amazon S3), an IaaS cloud service
allowing user-deployed code (e.g., Amazon EC2) and any
blockchains supporting smart contracts. In the prototype,
the storage-manager smart contract is implemented in solid-
ity [21]. The off-chain code is written in Python. In particular,
the replica manager and ADS protocol relies on a Python
binding to interact with the underlying LevelDB [13]. In
practice, we use the suggested transaction fee (e.g., 21000
Gas) and Gas price (i.e., 2 GWei) in the evaluation (Section 4
and Section 5), which are sufficient for Ethereum Ropsten
testnet [20] to accept our transactions. How to set Gas price
under more adversarial settings such as DoS attacks is out
of the scope of this paper.
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4 Case Studies
We have built two real applications on GRuB. One is an
Ether-backed stablecoin based on a price feed by GRuB and
the other is a cross-chain token exchange between Ethereum
and Bitcoin based on a BtcRelay style side-chain feed.
4.1 Stablecoins based on Price Feeds
Recall that indirectly-backed stablecoins require feeding the
price of the asset that backs the stablecoin. For instance,
in stablecoin platform MakerDAO, each currency unit, a
DAI, is pegged and redeemable to one-USD worth of Ether.
Issuing and redeeming DAI requires Ether price feeds. We
build a GRuB-based price feed and use it to support a custom
stablecoin SCoin that simulates a simpler DAI.
Specifically, we build a price feed based on GRuB where
the KV records store the prices of different assets includ-
ing Ether. SCoin is implemented as a custom ERC20 token
whose supply (in terms of token issuance and redemption)
is controlled by a smart contract we build, listed as SCoinIs-
suer. The smart contract issues SCoins upon receiving Ether
payments from an external buyer (i.e., issue function), and
upon a seller’s request to redeem an SCoin, transferring one-
USD worth of Ether to the seller before destroying the SCoin
(i.e., redeem function). To make sure SCoin is pegged and
redeemable to one USD, the smart contract needs to read the
Ether price at the time of issuance and redemption, as well
as requiring over-collateralization and locking up remaining
Ether. This implements a minimalist MakerDAO based on
the working example in [37].
Cost evaluation: For Gas evaluation, we implemented
three price feeds, including GRuB and the two static baselines
(BL1 and BL2). We used the call trace of a real price feed,
ethPriceOracle [18]. Recall Section 2.1 that this trace records
the Ether-price updates and reads from April 25th, 2018
to April 30th, 2018. In our experiment, we set up multiple
assets in the price feed: In practice, there are many assets
that can be used to back a stablecoin, such as more than
2500 tokens [6] just on Ethereum, fiat currencies (e.g.,USD,
Japanese Yen, Euro) and various commodities (gold). We
thus set up a KV store of 4096 records in the price feed, each
presenting an asset and its price (⟨asset_name,price⟩). In
this setup, a gPuts batches price updates of 10 assets, which
we use duplicates of the Ether price updates. Each peek()
call in the trace issues a gGet invocation with with a callback
to SCoinIssuer’s issue() or refund(), at the equal chance.
By this means, we drive the call trace into GRuBPriceFeed
and SCoinIssuer.
Table 3. Gas at the data-feed layer and Gas of the end appli-
cation:M denotes million of Gas.
Price feed SCoinIssuer
BL1 83M (+64%) 86M (+67%)
BL2 55M (+11%) 56M (+8.7%)
GRuB 50.6M 51.7M
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Figure 5. Gas under the 5-day trace (ethPriceOracle)
The result illustrated in Figure 5 shows that GRuB con-
sistently achieves the lowest Gas per operation among the
three. Most of the time, BL1 and GRuB achieve lower Gas
than BL2. The exception is around epoch 11 when it involves
more data reads that put BL1 at disadvantage. Even in this
case, GRuB achieves lower Gas than BL2.
Table 3 shows the Gas cost at the data-feed layer and
in the end application (SCoinIssuer). It can be seen while
SCoinIssuer adds Gas due to application-specific logic, the
Gas saving at the data feeding layer is still quite significant.
4.2 BtcRelay Side-chains and Pegged Tokens
BtcRelay feeds Bitcoin blocks to Ethereum and is an impor-
tant building block for Bitcoin-pegged tokens on Ethereum.
We use GRuB to enable BtcRelay by storing the mappings
of block hash and Bitcoin block header in the KV store. The
DO runs a trusted off-chain Bitcoin client that gets notified
every time a Bitcoin block is found.
Based on this data feed, we build a Bitcoin-pegged ERC20
token as an application. The DU smart contract is a simple
ERC20 token that supports the operations of mint and burn
that consume Bitcoin blocks from the feed: A token-mint
(token-burn) operation requires verifying the inclusion of a
Bitcoin-deposit (Bitcoin-redeem) transaction against recent
Bitcoin blocks from the feed.
Building benchmark: Methodology: We collected the
trace of transactions to mint/burn eight Bitcoin-pegged to-
kens known from etherscan.io [26]. The transactions are ob-
tained from Ethereum ETL service on Google BigQuery [7]
and create a token-contract workload benchmark using the
method detailed below.
Experiment results: We measure the Gas cost by GRuB
under the workload. We set up an epoch that contains four
transactions and drive the established benchmark to our ex-
periments. Particularly, unlike the ethPriceOracle, the BtcRe-
lay workload does not overwrite existing records, but instead
appends updates to them. We configure GRuB with reusable
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Figure 6. GRuB under the BtcRelay trace
storage upon replicating a record. To make the room, previ-
ously replicated records are evicted if they are not accessed
for a long time.
The result of Gas cost per operation is reported in Figure 6.
The trace of the first 25 epochs is write-intensive. In this
phase, BL1 outperforms BL2, and GRuB converges to BL1.
From epoch 26 to epoch 50, the trace becomes more read-
intensive. And BL2 outperforms BL1, and GRuB gradually
converges to BL2 (at epoch 34). Overall, GRuB’s Gas saving
is 56.7%/14.5% compared with BL1/BL2.
5 Cost Evaluation
This section presents the experiments for evaluating the
Gas of GRuB. Specifically, our experiments are designed to
answer the following questions:
1. Whether and how fast will GRuB converge to changing
workloads?
2. How sensitive is GRuB’s cost to the various parameters
that GRuB exposes?
We perform experiments under microbenchmarks (Sec-
tion 5.1) and macro-benchmarks with YCSB [38] (Section 5.2).
5.1 Microbenchmarks: Converged Gas under
Repeating Workloads
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Figure 7. GRuB’s Gas with varying read-write ratios
In this subsection, we evaluate GRuB’s Gas under repeat-
ing workloads. We generate the workload that consists of
repeated reads and writes under a fixed ratio. Under such
workloads, GRuB makes the same decisions, and the Gas
becomes converged. Our goal is to evaluate the converged
Gas under different factors.
Read-to-write ratio: In this experiment, we evaluate the
Gas with different read-to-write ratios. For comparison to
GRuB, we consider both baselines of static data replication
(i.e., BL1 and BL2). Also, we consider the two baseline designs
for dynamic data replication that respectively store on the
Blockchain, the trace of reads and writes, and the trace of
reads. In each experiment, we drive the synthetic workload
of a specific read-to-write ratio to the system and measure
the total Gas. We report the average Gas per operation.
In the results reported in Figure 7, baseline BL1 (BL2) has
its Gas increased (decreased) as the workload shifts from
write-intensive to read-intensive. There is a crossover be-
tween BL1 and BL2 when the workload’s read-to-write ratio
is around 2. GRuB’s Gas is slightly higher than BL1 for the
read-to-write ratio smaller than 2 and is slightly higher than
BL2 for the ratio larger than 2. Note that choosing the one be-
tween BL1 and BL2 with lower Gas constitutes an ideal, Gas-
optimal dynamic-replication scheme. In this sense, GRuB’s
(converged) Gas is close to the optimal case. Comparing with
the two dynamic-replication baselines, GRuB saves Gas sig-
nificantly: Especially in read-intensive workloads, GRuB’s
Gas savings can reach an order of magnitude.
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Figure 8. Gas with different algorithms and record sizes
Choice of the algorithm: In this experiment, we evaluate
how the choice of algorithms affect GRuB’s Gas. Recall that
we proposed two decision-making algorithms, and they dif-
fer in that the memoryless (memorizing) algorithm decides
without (with) remembering the historical operations. To
contrast the two algorithms to the maximal degree, we use
the following experimental setting: We set parameterK = K ′
and use the workload of read-to-write ratio K + 1. We drive
the workload to GRuB with the two different algorithms. Fig-
ure 8a reports the Gas per operation along with the timeline
(indexed by transactions, each encoding 32 operations). It
can be seen GRuB with the memoryless algorithm incurs
constant Gas, which is about 5 times higher than the optimal
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offline decision-making (whose Gas is calculated in a simi-
lar way with the previous experiment in Section 5.1). GRuB,
with a memorizing algorithm, configured withK ′ = 8,D = 1,
initially has a similar level of Gas consumption with mem-
oryless GRuB, and then gradually reduces the Gas close to
the optimal algorithm.
Record size:In this experiment, we evaluate how GRuB’s
Gas is affected by data record size. We vary the record size
from one word (32 bytes) to 16 words. The experiment results
reported in Figure 8b show that Gas per operation increases
linearly with the record size. GRuB is cheaper in Gas than
both BL1 and BL2. When the record is of 16 words, the Gas
savings by GRuB reach the max, that is, 7× and 3× compared
to BL2 and BL1, respectively.
5.2 Macro-benchmarks on YCSB
 ✁✂✄☎  ✆✝ ✞  ✟✝ ✠  ✡✝ ✞  ☛✝ ✠
Figure 9. GRuB under mixed YCSB workloads (A and B)
Table 4. Aggregated Gas for mixed YCSB workloads
Workload BL1 BL2 GRuB
A, B 1438,130,508 (+31.6%) 1588,684,289 (+45.4%) 1092,576,982
A, E 1400,290,302 (+25.7%) 1936,114,585 (+73.8%) 1114,217,927
A, F 1746,854,231 (+54.1%) 1252,009,322 (+10.4%) 1133,858,720
This set of experiments are designed to evaluate the Gas
of GRuB under mixed YCSB workloads. YCSB [38] is an
industrial-strength benchmark providing six KV-store work-
loads, codenamed from A to F, that model some real work-
loads in Yahoo cloud services. We use YCSB workloads to
evaluate GRuB, because of the following reason: GRuB ex-
poses the same KV-store API with most cloud-storage ser-
vices and brings trustworthiness to these services. Thus,
GRuB can and should be a secure alternative to host cloud
workloads, especially for security-sensitive applications. In
preparing GRuB macro-benchmarks, we mix multiple YCSB
workloads, for instance, Workload A and E.
In our experiments, we used three combinations: mixing
Workload A and B, mixing Workload A and E, and mixing
Workload A and F. Workload A/B/E/F respectively feature
50% reads/95% reads/95% scans/75% reads as well as differ-
ent key-distribution strategies. In each mixed workload, we
pre-load 216 KV records to the GRuB. In Workloads A,B and
Workloads A,E, each KV record is set to be 1024-bytes long.
In Workload A,F, each KV record is 32-byte long. Each exper-
iment consists of four phases, in each of which one workload
generator (i.e., A/B/E/F) is chosen to produce 4096 opera-
tions. We report the average Gas per operation for every
four transactions (or an epoch).
We report the experiments results by time-series data in
Figure 9 and by aggregate results in Table 4. It can be seen
that in the first phase P1 (Workload A of 50% reads), the non-
replication baseline, BL1, performs better than replication
baseline BL2. In Phase P1, GRuB’s Gas is close to that of BL1.
In the second phase, when the workload switches to Work-
load B (of 95% reads), the replication baseline BL2 achieves
lower Gas than BL1. In Phase P2, GRuB’s Gas is lower than
BL1 but higher than BL2: Especially at the beginning of P2,
GRuB incurs high Gas because of the decision to replicate a
KV record being read. Phase P3 is similar to P1. In Phase P4,
GRuB’s Gas is much lower than P2 because records being
read in this phase may already be replicated in Phase P2. The
aggregated result, the Gas per operation averaged overall
operations, is reported in Table 4, where GRuB saves 32%Gas
of BL2 and 46% Gas of BL1. Note that Figure 9 shows a lower
rate of saving than Figure 7, because the YCSB workloads
tested here are with more restrictive read-write rates than
the synthetic workloads used in Figure 7.
6 Related Work
In this section, we describe two research bodies most rele-
vant to our work: cost-effective blockchain applications and
workload-aware data replication schemes.
Cost-effective blockchain applications: It is well
known that blockchain has limited throughput in han-
dling transactions [39] and incurs high unit cost to execute
smart contracts. To reduce the blockchain costs, general
approaches are developed by focusing on a permissioned
setting [34, 41, 58, 60], or by sharding the blockchain and
other layer-one designs [44, 49, 58]. Unfortunately, these new
blockchain designs cannot be integrated with an operational
blockchain and are known to be difficult to deploy at scale.
A more practical design paradigm, also more relevant to
our work, is the layer-two approaches that aim at reduc-
ing the use of blockchain in a domain application, without
changing the underlying blockchain mechanisms. Notably,
payment channels and networks [16, 36, 52] process multiple
micro-payments off-chain with issuing two Bitcoin trans-
actions. There are payment networks adopted in practice,
such as Lightning Networks in the Bitcoin mainnet [16].
Teechain [47] is a payment network that offloads the detec-
tion of participant misbehavior to trusted hardware off-chain,
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further reducing the involvement of blockchain and improv-
ing the application throughput. Similarly, Tesseract [32] em-
ploys off-chain trusted hardware to facilitate the payments
and exchanges with lower-level involvement of blockchains,
to achieve real-timeness and higher throughput. Beyond the
simple application of payments, there are authenticated data
structures proposed, such as TPAD [62] andGEM2 trees [68],
to enable the secure handling of database queries off-chain.
These layer-two protocols and systems have their off-chain
component statically fixed and are not aware of the changing
workloads. By contrast, GRuB is the first work that dynami-
cally replicates data onto blockchain.
Testimonium [59] is a Gas-effective blockchain relay (or
in our terminology, side-chain feed) which achieves low
Gas by lazily validating blocks from a remote blockchain.
Our GRuB differs from Testimonium in two senses: First, our
focus on data feeding makes GRuBmore generally applicable.
GRuB supports applications that rely on real-world data feed
(e.g., price-feed based stablecoins) that Testimonium cannot
support. Second, Testimonium can be thought of as a static
data-replication scheme, as it optimistically stores blocks
from the remote blockchain without validation.
TownCrier [69] is a provable-secure data feed service built
on off-chain trusted hardware that connects TLS-certified
websites to blockchains. The data-feed storage in TownCrier
is always off-chain and it does not address the dynamic data
replication as in GRuB.
Gasper [35] is a compiler-based optimization pass that
detects Gas-inefficiency anti-pattern in the generated con-
tract bytecode. This language-based optimization takes into
account the information at syntactic level and is not aware
of any application semantics. Compared to Gasper, GRuB is
modeled based on the data-feed design pattern of blockchain
applications and is aware of application semantics.
Workload-aware data replication: In distributed
databases, adaptive data replication [42, 43, 65] has been
studied: A framework has been proposed by dynamically
monitoring the workload and making replication decisions
based on the current workload. Many web applications ex-
hibit skewed data-access patterns. MET [40] is a KV store
management system that adapts the system configuration
and cloud-resource provisioning to the current workload. In
designing P2P-based DNS services, Beehive [57] is a proac-
tive data replication scheme that is tailored for Zipf query
distribution and achieves the constant look-up cost. GRuB’s
dynamic replication scheme is inspired by these classic tech-
niques and addresses the technical challenges when combin-
ing these classic techniques with blockchains’ cost model.
7 Conclusion
This work presents GRuB, a dynamic data replication scheme
that achieves low Gas under changing data-access workloads.
GRuB runs a Gas-aware, security-centric control framework
off the Blockchain. Evaluation shows GRuB saves Gas by
upto 70% compared with existing approaches.
A Appendix: Algorithm Analysis
This section analyzes the competitiveness of online algorithms, that
is, the worst-case complexity compared with that of an optimal
off-line algorithm.
TheoremA.1. Memoryless Algorithm 1 with parameters configured
by Equation 1 is 2-competitive w.r.t. the Gas cost.
Proof. We first set up the stage by considering an ideal offline algo-
rithm with optimal cost. This offline algorithm can know the entire
sequence of reads and writes in advance, and learn the cost-optimal
decision. For instance, it can check given a write, if there are more
than K consecutive reads that occur after it (before the next write).
If so, it can replicate the record at the time of the write, instead of
waiting until K reads as in the online algorithm.
For our online algorithm, the worst-case sequence of reads and
writes is that every write is followed by exactly K reads. This is the
worst-case for our online algorithm because every data replica made
by the algorithm is never read, in other words, the cost of replication
is totally wasted without saving any cost (of follow-up reads). In
this worst case, the cost of our algorithm isK ∗Cr ead_of f +Cupdate .
In this case, the cost of the ideal offline algorithm isCupdate . Thus,
the competitiveness of our online algorithm is 1 + K ∗ Cr ead_of fCupdate .
Plugging Equation 1 in, we have a competitiveness is bounded
by 1 + CupdateCr ead_of f ∗
Cr ead_of f
Cupdate
, which is equal to 2. □
Theorem A.2. Memorizing Algorithm 2 is 4D+2K ′ -competitive.
Proof. We use the same offline algorithm as in proving TheoremA.1.
We consider the following sequence of reads/writes for analyzing
the worst-case of our memorizing algorithm. The read-write se-
quence consists of a series of sub-sequences, where the i-th subse-
quence is ofAi reads and Bi writes. We will setAi and Bi such that
the algorithm will make “wrong” decisions about data replication:
It will decide to replicate the data record when it sees Ai reads, and
then not to replicate after seeing the next Bi writes. Because each
replication decision is followed by writes, the replica is not being
read. In other words, the cost of replication is paid without any
cost benefit in serving reads by replica. Each no-replication deci-
sion is followed by reads, so the follow-up reads are served at the
high cost without data replica. In summary, every decision made
by the algorithm does not save the cost of serving the following
operations, but still incurs the cost of data replication. In this sense,
this sequence serves the worst case of our algorithm.
In the i-th sequence, when the algorithm seesAi reads, it satisfies
the in-equation (B1+B2+ ...Bi −1) ∗K ′ <= (A1+A2+ ...+Ai )−D;
When it sees Bi writes, it satisfies the in-equation (B1+B2+...+Bi )∗
K ′ > (A1 +A2 + ... +Ai )+D; Combining the two in-equations, we
conclude that Ai > 2D, Bi >= Ai/K ′. Finally, the general formula
for the i-th sequence is: Ai = D when 4i = 1; Ai = 2D + 1 when
i > 1; Bi = (2D + 1)/K ′.
The cost of the i-th sequence in our algorithm isAi ∗Cr ead_of f +
Cupdate + (Bi − 1) ∗Cupdate , and the cost of the ideal offline algo-
rithm isCupdate ; thus the competitiveness of the memorizing algo-
rithm is Ai ∗ Cr ead_of f /Cupdate + Bi , since Cr ead_of f /Cupdate
equals 1/K ′, the competitiveness is (4D + 2)/K ′. □
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B Detailed Data-Plane of GRuB
B.1 Static Data Structures
The state of data replication is stored in our system by aug-
menting the KV records. Each KV record, say ⟨k,v⟩, is as-
sociated with a replication state s , where the state can be
either NR (i.e., not replicated on the Blockchain) or R (i.e.,
replicated on the Blockchain).
Recall that the SP maintains a KV store. The KV store on
the untrusted SP is protected via an authentication data struc-
ture (ADS), which allows for trusted data updates and reads,
and prevents the untrusted SP from forging the dataset. For
the sake of simplicity, we use a binaryMerkle tree to illustrate
our system. The Merkle tree is built on top of the KV dataset
with replication states. Specifically, the data layout on which
the Merkle tree is built is the following: KV records are first
grouped by the replication states, and then they are sorted
by data keys. This data layout allows the Merkle tree to serve
the range query on NR data records, which is required in the
data-read protocol in GRuB (Section B.2.2). For instance, the
four KV records in Figure 4b fall under two groups, the NR
records (i.e., ⟨k = w,NR,v = 100⟩, ⟨y,NR, 200⟩) and the R
records (i.e., ⟨x ,R, 300⟩, ⟨z,R, 400⟩). In each group, KV data
records are sorted by data keys, and a Merkle tree is built on
top of the two groups of KV records, as in Figure 4b.
B.2 Data-Plane Protocols
B.2.1 Data Writes
On the write path, DO continuously produces data writes to
update the KV dataset. It needs to update both the primary
copy stored on SP and the replica stored on the Blockchain.
The data writes should be persisted, to one or two data copies,
securely against the untrusted SP. To achieve these goals,
we design the data-write protocol in GRuB to entail the
following steps, which are also illustrated in Figure 10b:
w1 Given a data write, the DO interacts with SP in an au-
thentication data structure protocol to securely update
both R and NR KV records stored on SP. With a binary
Merkle tree, it entails that SP sends a Merkle proof
to DO, who updates the Merkle root hash (or digest)
locally. Specifically, given a write on KV record ⟨k,v⟩,
the Merkle proof is the Merkle-tree nodes surrounding
the path from the leaf of this KV record to the root.
An example will be shown in the next paragraph. The
DO receiving the proof verifies it against its current
root hash and then updates the root hash based on the
new KV record ⟨k,v⟩.
w2 At the end of every epoch, DO batches data writes
on replicated KV records. It sends the batched writes
and the latest digest in a transaction to the Blockchain.
The storage contract on the Blockchain exposes the
following contract function:
The storage-management contract processes the write
request to update the copy of the digest on the
Blockchain and the replicated KV records. There is
a delay in updating data replica on the Blockchain
which affects the consistency of data reads.
w0 In the end of every epoch, DO also collects the op-
eration trace and runs a control framework (in Sec-
tion 3.2) to update data-replication states dynamically.
Concretely, DO collects the trace of data writes locally,
and the trace of data reads from SP (see Figure 10b).
It then feeds the traces as input to the control frame-
work, which produces the output of updated replica-
tion states.
The state transitions are incorporated into the trans-
action sent in w2 . The storage-management contract
processes state transition NR → R by inserting the
data replica to the buffer in the contract. It processes
state transition R → NR by invalidating an existing
replica in the contract buffer.
Examples: Suppose DO produces one data update in an
epoch, ⟨w, 110⟩. The initial state of the system, illustrated in
Figure 4b, is that the record is not replicated, ⟨w,NR, 110⟩.
Assume in Step w0 the control framework does not update
replication state. In Step w1 , the Merkle proof that the DO re-
trieves from SP ish5,h3. After verification based on the proof,
she then updates the KV record from ⟨w, 100⟩ to ⟨w, 110⟩.
She also computes the new hash h′4 = H (⟨w, 110⟩) to replace
the old h4. The new root hash is calculated h′1 = H (h3∥h′2)
where h′2 = H (h′4∥h5). In Step w2 , the transaction sent to the
storage contract contains the new root hash (h′1), and noth-
ing else (due to no state transition or no update on replicated
records).
For another example, suppose DO produces one data up-
date ⟨x , 310⟩ against the same initial state in Figure 4b. Here,
the original record is replicated, ⟨x ,R, 300⟩. Assume in Step
w0 the control framework will update the replication state
from R to NR (e.g., by a memoryless decision-making algo-
rithm that is described in Section 3.1). The state transition
triggers the KV record to be relocated, that is, leaving the
group of R records and joining the group of NR records. In
Step w1 , the proof is the Merkle proof of its current loca-
tion (i.e., h2,h7) and that of its new location. The new loca-
tion is between records ⟨w,NR, 100⟩, ⟨y,NR, 200⟩ and the
proof of the new location includes h3 and these two records.
DO verifies the integrity of the original record using the
proof against its current digest. DO then relocates the KV
record (due to new replication state) and produces the new
root hash. This is done by marking the original KV record
invalid (i.e., h′6 = H (⟨x ,R, 300, invalid⟩), and by updating
the Merkle tree with h′3 = H (h′6∥h7),h′1 = H (h2∥h′3)) and
by inserting the new KV record at the new location (i.e.,
h8 = H (⟨x ,NR, 310⟩),h9 = H (h4∥h8),h′2 = H (h9∥h5),h′′1 =
H (h′2∥h′3)). In Step w2 , the transaction sent by DO includes
the new root hash h′′1 , the KV record with a state transi-
tion, namely ⟨x ,NR, 310⟩. The storage contract receiving
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(b) Detailed view of GRuB system and proto-
cols: Grey boxes are core components imple-
mented in our GRuB prototype
Figure 10. GRuB system: data plane, control plane and security data structures
the transaction will invalidate the replica of the original
record, ⟨x ,R, 300⟩.
B.2.2 Data Reads
In the read path, an end blockchain client (not shown in the
figure) submits a query to execute application smart contract
and read the blockchain state. The data-read protocol for
trusted query processing is described below. The steps are
also illustrated in Figure 10b.
r1 The application smart contract, which is data user
(DU), issues a gGet request to the storage management
smart contract which finds the matching data records
(in the case of replication, R). If the data is not found,
the storage smart contract emit an event to request
data from off-chain SP.
r2 The SP watches the blockchain event log and upon
finding a request, it starts to evaluate the query over
NR KV records. It retrieves NR KV records that match
the query. SP also prepares the query proof from the
Merkle tree. The proof consists of the Merkle authen-
tication paths surrounding the NR records.
r3 The SP sends the NR records matching the query and
the query q itself to the Blockchain. The storage con-
tract receiving the transaction will verify the integrity
of NR records and then triggers the query-processing
contract to process the query by accessing the re-
trieved NR records and the R records replicated on
the Blockchain.
Example: Suppose the system initial state is illustrated
in Figure 4b and a data user (DU) smart contract sends
a range query q = [x , z] in r1 . In Step r2 , SP evalu-
ates the range predicate and produces the following NR
records that match the query: ⟨y,NR, 200⟩. The Merkle
proof is h7, ⟨w,NR, 100⟩, ⟨x ,R, 300⟩. In Step r3 , the storage-
management contract verifies the integrity and completeness
of NR records using the proof against the digest stored on
the Blockchain.
C Additional Evaluation Results
C.1 Microbenchmarks
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Figure 11. GRuB’s Gas with varying parameter K
Varying parameter K : We additionally measure the Gas
of memoryless GRuB with a varying value of K . Recall that
K states the threshold number of reads to flip the algorithm’s
decision to replication R. In the experiment, we drive work-
loads of varying read-to-write ratios and report the Gas per
operation under different values of K . In the experiment re-
sult in Figure 11, given a fixed workload (say read-to-write
ratio being 2), the Gas first increases with K , then decreases
and finally stays at a constant value. The highest Gas repre-
sents the worst case that the Gas paid for data replication
does not result in any Gas savings for future data reads.
Before Gas reaches the peak value, increasing K results in
increased Gas (due to more off-chain reads and more transac-
tions). After the peak Gas, increasing K results in decreased
Gas (due to that off-chain reads are capped in the workload).
With different workloads, the value of K under the peak Gas
increases along with the read-to-write ratios.
Varying threshold read-write ratio: The threshold
read-write ratio triggers the switch of replication decision
and is the case where BL1 and BL2 incur the same Gas.
It affects the range of workloads that dynamic replication
schemes can win. We measure the threshold read-write ratio
under varying record size and data size. In Figure 12a, as the
record size grows, the threshold ratio significantly increases.
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Figure 12. GRuB’s Threshold read-write ratio
This is because of the higher unit cost for storage write than
that for transactions in the Gas model. In Figure 12b, as the
data size increases, the proof size grows, which decreases
the threshold ratio. This is because the increased proof per
record in BL2 needs to be amortized by more writes in BL1.
C.2 Macrobenchmarks with YCSB
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(b)Workload A, F
Figure 13. GRuB under mixed YCSB workloads
Additional YCSB workloads: Figure 13a shows the Gas
per operation under Workload A and E. The results are sim-
ilar except that the initial cost to replicate KV records is
even more significant (notice the Gas spike of GRuB in P2).
This can be attributed to that fewer data keys are used in
this experiment, which makes a KV record be read multiple
times in Phase P2 and P4 and triggers more data replication.
The aggregate Gas saving by GRuB reaches 25% against BL1
and 74% against BL2.
Figure 13b shows the Gas per operation under Workload
A and F. In this experiment, we used small KV records of 32-
byte long. It can be seen that the Gas per operation changes
dramatically fromWorkload A to Workload F. Overall, GRuB
saves 54% of the Gas than BL1 and 10% of the Gas than BL2.
Varying K under YCSB: Figure 14 illustrates the GRuB’s
Gas under YCSB workloads, with K varying between 0.1 to
64. Compared with the two baselines, GRuB’s Gas is sensitive
to K . When growing K , the Gas first decreases, reaches the
lowest value (with K = 2) and then increases. The U shape
of the curve can be explained by the following: K = 2 best
matches the tested YCSB workload (in terms of its read-write
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Figure 14. GRuB’s Gas under YCSB with varying K
ratio and its change over time) so that the decision made by
GRuB predicts the future workload.
C.3 Workload-Adaptive K
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Figure 15. GRuB with two adaptive-K policies under eth-
PriceOracle
Table 5. Aggregated Gas under ethPriceOracle
Approach Aggregated Gas (X106)
Memoryless (K=1) 50.16
Memorizing (Adaptive
K1)
50.61(+0.8%)
Memorizing (Adaptive
K2)
43.74(−12.8%)
Heuristic for adaptive K : So far, Parameter K in GRuB
is set statically and does not change at runtime. Changing K
dynamically and adaptively to the current workload may fur-
ther improve GRuB’s cost saving. Here, we present a simple
heuristic to adjust K dynamically based on the observation
of workload history. In this heuristic, encountering a write,
GRuB predictsK to be the average number of reads per write
in the selected past trace. As an example setting, we consider
the past three writes. If the predicted K is larger than the
value of Equation 1, GRuB decides to replicate the write (i.e.,
R). Otherwise, GRuB decides against replicating the write
(i.e., NR). We name this policy by Adaptive K1. K1 is based
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on the intuition that the future will repeat the past. For com-
parison, we also design a “dual” policy, named adaptive K2,
whose decision is opposite to K1. That is, when the predicted
K is smaller than the value of Equation 1, GRuB decides
against replication (NR); otherwise, it decides to replicate
(R). Thus, K2 reflects that the future does not repeat the past.
Experiments: We conduct the experiments using the eth-
PriceOracle trace (recall Section 2.1 and Section 4) and report
the Gas per operation in Figure 15 and Table 5. The result
shows that Adaptive K1 incurs +0.8% more Gas than the
baseline of static K. Adaptive K2 saves about 12.8% Gas than
the static K baseline.
The lesson we learn here is that the assumption that the
future repeats the past does not necessarily hold and is work-
load specific. In general, the idea of adaptive parameters
(e.g., K ) has the potential of saving the Gas cost further, but
to result in actual cost saving, it requires lots of heuristics
and workload-specific tuning. Using machine learning tech-
niques to automatically and adaptively find an optimal K is
an open research problem and can be addressed in the future
work.
D Build BtcRelay Benchmarks
Building benchmarks: Methodology To build the bench-
mark, we follow the method below: For a Bitcoin-pegged
token, we first locate the mint/burn function which has an
argument for the Bitcoin depositor/withdraw transaction
(ConditionM1). Through this, we can bind a tokenmint/burn
operation to a Bitcoin transaction, and further to a Bitcoin
block. As a mint/burn operation with on-chain BtcRelay
entails reading six Bitcoin blocks, the trace of mint/burn
transactions can be converted to a history of Bitcoin-block
reads on Ethereum. Then, we establish an overall block-read
history by combining the reads from different tokens. This
block-read history is joined with Bitcoin’s native block-write
history (i.e., the sequence of Bitcoin blocks produced over
time) to establish the block read-write workload.
We apply the abovemethod to eight Bitcoin-pegged tokens
known from etherscan.io [26]. We found four tokens meet
the condition M1, that is, tBTC, imBTC, wBTC and hBTC.
Particularly, tBTC has an on-chain BtcRelay and has M1-
compatible functions, namely provideBTCFundingProof [?
]/provideRedemptionProof, to receive Bitcoin transactions.
The other three actually run BtcRelay off-chain but still ex-
pose M1-compatible functions and are amenable for building
the benchmarks (e.g., addMintRequest [? ] having an argu-
ment storing Bitcoin transaction hash in wBTC).
Then we collect the mint calls and burn calls from the
Ethereum ETL service on Google BigQuery [7]. From there,
we combine the four tokens’ read traces and join it with the
Bitcoin block write sequence [? ].
Workload analysis: The workload is presented in Fig-
ure 16a, where we can see the number of reads per write
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Figure 16. The workloads of BtcRelay in existing Bitcoin-
pegged ERC20 tokens
Table 6. Distribution of writes by the number of reads fol-
lowed in the BtcRelay trace (#r represents the number of
reads per write)
#r Percentage #r Percentage #r Percentage
0 93.7% 3 0.15% 6 0.02%
1 5.30% 4 0.05% 7 0.01%
2 0.77% 5 0.04%
varies between 0 and 7 in the case of BtcRelay. We also mea-
sure the “temporal locality” of the reads/writes to the same
Bitcoin block. In Figure 16b, most reads of a block occurs 4
hours after the block is produced (written).
E Protocol Consistency
We first present necessary preliminaries and definitions be-
fore analyzing the consistency of the GRuB protocol.
E.1 Preliminaries and Definitions
Blockchain & GRuB model: In a vanilla blockchain, it
takes Pt time units to propagate a transaction to all nodes in
the blockchain network. It takes an average of B time units
to produce a block. Only after F blocks are produced, a trans-
action is considered finalized in the blockchain network. For
instance, in Ethereum, F is 250 and B is 10 ∼ 19 seconds [66].
Consider two concurrent transactions, that is, one trans-
action is sent after the submission of the other but before the
finalization of the other. The ordering of the two transactions
is decided non-deterministically by the miners through the
underlying consensus protocol of the blockchain [? ]. Never-
theless, the consensus protocol guarantees the ordering is
the same across different nodes eventually after at least one
transaction is finalized.
In GRuB, an epoch E is the time interval in which the DO
waits and batches data updates in a transaction.
Query-freshness definition: Suppose a gGet(k) issued
by a DU smart contract at local time t on blockchain node
Ni returns a set of KV records qs . Query result qs is fresh,
w.r.t. delay d , if all KV records matching key k and updated
on data owner DO before t − d are included in qs . Here, it
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assumes a global clock synchronized across the DO and any
blockchain nodes Ni . Note that query freshness also implies
query completeness here.
E.2 Consistency Analysis
We focus on analyzing the consistency between a gGet(k)
and a gPut(k,v) operation, including read-after-write con-
sistency, operation ordering, et al. We consider two general
cases: a) The sequential case where gGet is issued sufficiently
long after a matching gPut. The exact delay d0 between gGet
and gPut is E + Pt + B · F , which will be described later. b)
The concurrent case where gGet is issued concurrently (i.e.,
within delay d0) with a matching gPut.
For the concurrent case, GRuB inherent the non-
deterministic but “eventual” consistency of the underly-
ing blockchain. That is, whether gGet observes gPut, and
more generally, the ordering between gGet and gPut, are
non-deterministic but eventually consistency across all
blockchain nodes after the finalization of related transac-
tions. Formally,
Theorem E.1 (Non-deterministic ordering of concurrent
gPut/gGet). Suppose at time t1 the DO submits a gPut(k,v)
and at time t2 a blockchain node Ni executes gGet(k). After
t2 + Pt + B · F , assume the execution of gGet(k) is finalized
on the blockchain.
Particularly, when the record gGet(k) accesses is not repli-
cated (NR), time t2 refers to when the internal call of gGet(k)
is being entered and returned by the blockchain node (the
synchronous execution finishes instantly). When the record
gGet(k) accesses is not replicated (NR), gGet(k) is executed
asynchronously and is called back by a deliver transaction. In
this case t2 refers to when the deliver transaction is executed
on node Ni .
If t1 < t2 < t1 + E + Pt + B · F , gPut(k,v) is said to occur
concurrently with gGet(k). With GRuB, the ordering between
concurrent gPut(k,v) and gGet(k) is non-deterministic and
is the same across all blockchain nodes after t2 + Pt + B · F .
We present the justification informally. The non-
deterministic ordering in GRuB directly inherits from that
of the underlying blockchain. That is, when the record ac-
cessed by gGet is replicated (R), the ordering between gGet
and gPut is reduced to the ordering between the transaction
that sends the batch including gPut and the transaction that
triggers the DU smart contract to internal-call gGet, which
is non-deterministic and eventually consistent due to the
blockchain.
When the record accessed by gGet is not replicated (NR),
the ordering between gGet and gPut is reduced to the order-
ing between the transaction that sends the batch including
gPut and the transaction that calls back the storage smart
contract to deliver the read value. The latter ordering be-
tween two transactions is non-deterministic and eventually
consistent due to the blockchain.
For the sequential case, we present the following theo-
rem:
Theorem E.2 (Epoch-bounded query freshness). GRuB
guarantees the gGet query freshness w.r.t. delay E + Pt + F · B,
where the parameters are epoch E, block time B, propagation
delay Pt and the number of blocks needed for finality F .
Proof. Consider a gGet(k) query issued at time t by a DU
smart contract. The query result includes a KV record q.
Assume the data update corresponding to q is produced by
the DO at time t ′. Then, the gPuts call that includes q must
be issued by the DO at time no later than t ′ + E. gPuts is
propagated to all blockchain nodes at the time t ′ + E + Pt .
Thus, the time the data update gets finalized in blockchain
is t ′ + E + Pt + F · B. If t ≤ t ′ + E + Pt + F · B, the gGet will
return record q, despite which of the two cases occurs: 1) If
q is replicated on blockchain, the gGet directly accesses the
on-chain storage and q.
2) If q is not replicated on the blockchain, the gGet re-
trieves record q from SP via request and deliver. At this
time, q is stored on SP’s KV store. If the SP is honest, she can
and will include q in the deliver call to the calling smart
contract. If the SP is dishonest, she may omit the record q.
If this occurs, GRuB’s Merkle trees on SP can ensure that
the verification can not pass, as it is hard to forge a non-
membership proof on the record that does exist. (Note that
the sorted data layout of the KV store on SP is authenticated
by the DO). □
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